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OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This suit is what remains from a failed merger between 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (“Cooper”) and Apollo 
Tyres Ltd. (“Apollo”).  OFI Asset Management and Timber 
Hill LLC – purporting to act for themselves and other 
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similarly situated investors (collectively, “OFI”)1 – filed this 
securities class action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware against Cooper and two of its 
officers.  OFI claims that, during the course of merger 
negotiations between Cooper and Apollo, the defendants 
made material misrepresentations in statements to investors, 
resulting in violations of federal securities laws.  The District 
Court dismissed OFI’s complaint in its entirety.  OFI now 
appeals, complaining that the District Court improperly 
managed the presentation of arguments and wrongly 
dismissed the case.  Because we conclude that the District 
Court acted within its discretion on case management and was 
correct in its decision that OFI failed to allege sufficient facts 
to support its claims, we will affirm. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND  
 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 
 
 Cooper is a one-hundred-year-old tire manufacturer 
based in Findlay, Ohio.  The individual defendants, Roy 
Armes and Bradley Hughes, were, respectively, Cooper’s 
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer during 
the time relevant to this action.  Cooper’s international 
operations included Cooper Chengshan Tire Company, Ltd. 
(“CCT”) in China, a joint venture formed in 2006, 65% of 
                                              
1 For simplicity, we will refer to OFI in the singular.  
 
2 We recount the facts in the light most favorable to 
OFI.  See Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 
2007).         
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which was owned by Cooper.  Chengshan Group 
(“Chengshan”), led by Chairman Che Hongzhi (“Che”), 
owned the remaining 35% of CCT.  As of mid-2013, CCT 
was Cooper’s most profitable manufacturing facility, 
contributing approximately 25% of Cooper’s revenue and 
profits.   
 
 Cooper’s presence in China was a key motivation 
behind Apollo’s efforts to merge with Cooper.  Those efforts 
began in August 2012, when Apollo suggested the possibility 
of buying Cooper for $22.75 per share.  Flirtation progressed 
to “serious” discussions in January 2013.  (J.A. at 55, ¶ 48).  
Between late 2012 and June 2013 (the “negotiation period”), 
Cooper explored merger opportunities with Apollo as well as 
other parties.  In January 2013, Chengshan indicated that it, 
with unidentified partners, might submit a bid for Cooper.   
 
 On March 7, 2013, Cooper met with Apollo to discuss 
the details of a potential deal, including Che’s possible 
reaction to the merger.  Armes asserted that “Cooper did not 
know how Chairman Che would react” and that his reaction 
could be anything from favorable to antagonistic; it was 
possible he would “really support it,” “sell his 35% stake,” or 
“try to undermine” it.  (J.A. at 41, 55-56, ¶¶ 8, 50.)  Cooper 
and Apollo also addressed (among other contingencies) the 
possibility that a union representing Cooper employees, the 
United Steelworkers Union (“USW”), would file grievances 
if a transaction were announced.   
 
 On April 10, “Party C,” which allegedly was a 
consortium including Chengshan, communicated that it 
intended to make a proposal to purchase Cooper.  While Party 
C was in frequent communication with Cooper during the 
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negotiation period, it never made a definitive proposal.  
During this period, Apollo and Cooper met with Che, who 
expressed opposition to a merger between Cooper and Apollo 
and suggested that he would prefer to “keep things going the 
way that [they] were.”  (J.A. at 41, ¶ 8.)   
 
 On June 12, Cooper and Apollo announced that they 
had entered into an agreement whereby Apollo would acquire 
Cooper for approximately $35 per share, a figure amounting 
to some $2.5 billion and representing a 40% premium over 
Cooper’s thirty-day volume-weighted average price.   
 
The Merger Agreement contained several disclaimers, 
one of which noted that the “representations and warranties 
… set forth herein shall be true and correct in all respects ... 
both when made … and as of the Closing Date.”  (J.A. at 
169.)  The SEC Form 8-K that accompanied the Agreement 
warned against reliance on the Agreement, saying “[t]he 
Merger Agreement contains representations and warranties 
made by [Cooper] and the Apollo Parties to, and solely for 
the benefit of, each other. … You should not rely on the 
representations and warranties in the Merger Agreement as 
characterizations of the actual state of facts about the 
Company or the Apollo Parties.”  (Opening Brief in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss, Ex. G, at 3, OFI Risk Arbitrages v. 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 14-cv-68-RGA (D. Del. 
Dec. 15, 2014), ECF No. 54.)  
 
 The Merger Agreement also included an extensive 
series of warranties. Those warranties provided, among other 
things, that Cooper “or one of its Subsidiaries has exclusive 
possession of each Owned Real Property and Leased Real 
Property” referenced in the Agreement (J.A. at 165), that 
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there was no “pending or … threatened … labor strike or 
lock-out or any material dispute, walk-out, work stoppage or 
slow-down involving [Cooper] or any of its Subsidiaries” 
(J.A. at 164), and that Cooper maintained “effective” 
“internal control over financial reporting” (J.A. at 162).  
 
  The reaction at CCT’s facility to the merger 
announcement was negative.  CCT workers went on strike on 
June 21.  Although they returned to work on June 28, they 
resumed their strike a few weeks later on July 13.  The 
workers finally returned to work on August 17 but they 
denied Cooper officials access to the facility, and they also 
stopped producing Cooper-branded tires.  By August 19, CCT 
had stopped providing financial information to Cooper.  
Cooper disclosed that fact in its next public filing, the 
August 30 Proxy Statement.  In the meantime, on August 9, 
Cooper filed its 10-Q for the quarter ending June 30.  That 
document disclosed a “temporary work stoppage” and a 
complaint filed by CCT’s union.  Cooper reported no material 
changes to its internal controls during that quarter, but it 
warned that the as-yet “temporary” CCT strike could hurt 
future performance if it persisted.  (J.A. at 141.)   
 
 The merger announcement also elicited a labor dispute 
in the United States.  On August 1, the USW filed grievances 
alleging that the proposed merger violated its collective 
bargaining agreements.  Cooper and Apollo sought expedited 
arbitration to preserve the timeline for closing the merger.  
The arbitrator ultimately ruled in favor of the USW and 
barred Cooper from selling two of its plants to Apollo, 
“unless and until the [USW] ha[s] entered into agreements 
with” Apollo.  (J.A. at 149).  Cooper disclosed the arbitration 
result to shareholders in an 8-K filing on September 19, 2013, 
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and it included assurances that it and Apollo were “continuing 
discussions with the [USW] with an aim of reaching an 
amicable resolution quickly to minimize any impact on the 
original closing schedule” and that the two companies 
“remain firmly committed to the strategic rationale for the 
Merger … and are optimistic that a mutually beneficial 
settlement can be reached.”  (J.A. at 149.)  As a result of this 
new hurdle, Apollo asked Cooper on September 25 to accept 
a price reduction.  Cooper declined.  That fact was not 
disclosed to shareholders, even though they were slated to 
vote on the merger five days later.   
 
 On August 30, Cooper issued its Proxy Statement, 
which described its intent to “work toward resolving [the 
CCT labor] issues and returning the facility to full, normal 
operation again as soon as possible.”  (J.A. at 201.)  Although 
Cooper warned that it could not “assure [investors] that any 
of our expectations … will be achieved,” the Proxy 
nevertheless concluded that “[n]either the [CCT] strike nor 
the plant slowdown are expected to have an effect on the 
consummation of the merger.”  (J.A. 182, 201.)   
 
 The Proxy also detailed the events leading up to the 
Merger Agreement, identifying all suitors other than Apollo 
by pseudonyms.  It did not identify Party C as being affiliated 
with Chengshan.  The Proxy included projections that Cooper 
had shared with Apollo and other potential purchasers during 
the negotiation period, as well as projections Cooper provided 
to its bankers to form a fairness opinion regarding the merger.  
But the Proxy was explicit that the projections were included 
“only because this information was provided to [Apollo], 
certain other potential purchasers and [Cooper’s] financial 
advisor” during negotiations. (J.A. at 197.)  It cautioned that 
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the projections were based on “assumptions that may now be 
outdated” and instructed that “[y]ou should not regard the 
inclusion of these projections … as an indication that Cooper 
[or] [Apollo] … considered or consider the projections to be 
necessarily predictive of actual future events, and you should 
not rely on the projections as such.”  (J.A. at 198.)  The Proxy 
also stated that the projections were “aspirational … rather 
than likely projections,” and it was candid that Cooper would 
not “make other projections public in the future.”  (Id.)   
 
 On September 30, Cooper stockholders approved the 
merger with Apollo.  That approval was announced in an 8-K 
and was accompanied by a statement from Armes describing 
the planned merger as a “compelling transaction” and 
asserting that the resulting company would have a “strong 
global footprint that includes a presence in ... the fastest 
growing geographies of India and China.”  (J.A. at 110, ¶ 86.)  
The 8-K did not mention Apollo’s continued requests for a 
price reduction.   
 
Having secured stockholder approval, Cooper reached 
out to Apollo to close the deal.  It refused, and Cooper filed 
suit against Apollo on October 4, 2013 in the Delaware 
Chancery Court, seeking to force Apollo to consummate the 
deal according to the terms of the Merger Agreement.  
Cooper asserted that Apollo had failed in its duty to use its 
“reasonable best efforts” to reach an agreement with the 
USW, as required by the arbitration decision issued the 
previous month, and that, but for that failure, the merger 
could have closed as planned.  Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd., No. CV 8980-VCG, 
2013 WL 5977140, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2013) (“Cooper 
Chancery Case”).  Apollo, in response, asserted that Cooper 
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had not satisfied all of the conditions precedent for the 
closing, citing in particular the inadequate provision of 
financial data.  Id.  The case generated substantial discovery 
and culminated in a three-day trial in early November 2013.  
Id.    
 
On November 8, following an unsuccessful 
interlocutory appeal, the Court of Chancery denied Cooper’s 
request for specific performance.  Id.  The Court found that 
Apollo had not, by that point, breached the duty to exercise 
“reasonable best efforts” in negotiating a new agreement with 
the USW, but it instructed that Apollo must continue those 
negotiations as required by the Merger Agreement.  Id.  
Having resolved the claim for immediate injunctive relief, the 
Court declined to rule on whether Cooper had, in fact, met the 
conditions precedent for the closing, describing the question 
as “hotly contested.”  Id.  That question thus remained 
unresolved.  
 
 No significant progress was made toward closing, and 
on December 30, 2013, Cooper formally terminated the 
planned merger, telling investors via webcast that the 
financing for the deal had fallen through and that it was “a 
reality that the [Merger Agreement] both companies signed 
on June 12 [would] not be consummated by Apollo.”   (J.A. at 
90, ¶ 134.)  
 
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In January 2014, OFI filed this action in the District 
Court.  (J.A. at 24.)  Its amended complaint (the “Complaint”) 
alleges that Cooper violated Sections 10(b), 14(a), and 20(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “’34 Act”), 
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codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a), and 78t(a).  Cooper 
moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to satisfy the 
heightened pleading burden that, under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”), applies to 
securities fraud claims.  Oral argument on the motion to 
dismiss was granted, and, because the claims center on 
allegations that Cooper told falsehoods, the District Court 
ordered OFI to submit a letter “identifying and verbatim 
quoting” the five most compelling examples it could muster 
of false or fraudulent statements by Cooper, with three factual 
allegations demonstrating the falsity of each statement and 
three factual allegations supporting a finding of scienter as to 
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the making of the statements.3  (J.A. at 31 (Docket entry No. 
60).)  The Court stated that oral argument would focus on 
OFI’s response.  (Id.)   
 
 On March 11, 2015, the District Court heard two hours 
of argument on Cooper’s motion to dismiss and OFI’s 
allegations.  During argument, the Court also requested 
supplemental information, which the parties subsequently 
provided.   
 
The District Court ultimately granted Cooper’s motion 
to dismiss, determining that OFI had failed to state a claim 
                                              
3 The order stated:  
Plaintiff is requested to submit a letter by 
March 4 identifying and verbatim quoting its 
five most compelling false or fraudulent 
statements, including the date on which they 
were made, with two paragraphs in support of 
each statement, one identifying no more than 
three factual allegations in support of the falsity, 
with each factual allegation citing the paragraph 
of the amended complaint in which it appears, 
and the second identifying no more than three 
factual allegations as to why at least one of the 
individual defendants knew it was false, again 
with citations to the amended complaint’s 
paragraphs for support. No legal argument. Oral 
argument is to focus on Plaintiff’s letter. 
(J.A. at 31.) 
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that satisfied the pleading standard of the PSLRA.  The Court 
determined that the statements identified as problematic by 
OFI were either not false or misleading, were “forward-
looking” statements protected by the safe harbor established 
by the PSLRA, lacked a sufficient showing of scienter, or 
suffered from some combination of those infirmities.  OFI 
Risk Arbitrages v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 14-cv-68-
RGA, 2015 WL 4036179 (D. Del. July 1, 2015).  OFI timely 
appealed. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION4 
 
 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Our review of the District Court’s dismissal of OFI’s 
Complaint is plenary.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. 
Fox Rothschild, LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010).  
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a 
court must “accept as true all [factual] allegations in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.”  Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 
2005)).  Ordinarily, it is sufficient to plead facts that do no 
more than raise an allegation to the level of plausibly 
warranting relief.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007) (to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 
                                              
4 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction to review the 
final judgment of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
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must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face”).  But in cases alleging securities fraud, 
plaintiffs must “satisfy the heightened pleading rules codified 
in” the PSLRA.  Institutional Inv’rs Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 
F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 
“[T]o restrict abuses in securities class-action 
litigation,” In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Secs. Litig., 438 
F.3d 256, 276 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), the PSLRA requires that the complaint must 
“specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the 
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an 
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on 
information and belief, the complaint shall state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed,” id. at 
276 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B)).  This standard 
“requires plaintiffs to plead the who, what, when, where and 
how: the first paragraph of any newspaper story.”  Avaya, 564 
F.3d at 253 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A complaint 
must also “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind,” U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A), specifically “scienter,” 
which is defined in this context as a “knowing or reckless” 
mental state “embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 252 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
OFI primarily alleges that Cooper made material 
misrepresentations to shareholders in violation of § 10(b) of 
the ’34 Act.  “The [Supreme] Court [has] prescribed a three-
step process for considering a motion to dismiss in a § 10(b) 
action.” Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 327 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. 
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551 U.S. 308, 322-23 (2007)).  First, as with all motions 
under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “accept all factual allegations 
in the complaint as true.”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.  Second, 
we “must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as 
other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents 
incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of 
which a court may take judicial notice.” Id.  Third, “in 
determining whether the pleaded facts give rise to a ‘strong’ 
inference of scienter, the court must take into account 
plausible opposing inferences.”  Id. at 323.  Only a complaint 
that provides sufficiently particularized factual pleading and 
gives rise to a strong inference of scienter can survive a 
motion to dismiss.  
 
In addition to establishing a heightened pleading 
standard, the PSLRA provides a so-called “safe harbor” that 
immunizes certain “forward-looking” statements from §10(b) 
liability.  That immunity applies if either the “forward-
looking statement is … identified as [such], and is 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying 
important factors that could cause actual results to differ 
materially from those in the forward-looking statement” or 
the plaintiff fails to prove the forward-looking statement “was 
made with actual knowledge by [the speaker] that the 
statement was false or misleading … .”5  15 U.S.C. § 78u-
5(c)(1).  
                                              
5 “The term ‘forward-looking statement’ is broadly 
defined in the statute … .” Avaya, 564 F.3d at 255.  The 
definition captures a wide range of statements, including 
those  
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That disjunctive statutory test provides two distinct 
entrances to the safe harbor.6  The first requires the use of 
“meaningful cautionary statements” regarding the forward-
looking statement.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).  “[A] 
vague or blanket (boilerplate) disclaimer which merely warns 
the reader that the investment has risks will ordinarily be 
inadequate to prevent misinformation. To suffice, the 
                                                                                                     
 
containing a projection of revenues, income 
(including income loss), earnings (including 
earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, 
dividends, capital structure, or other financial 
items”; statements of “the plans and objectives 
of management for future operations, including 
plans or objectives relating to the products or 
services of the issuer”; or statements of “future 
economic performance, including any such 
statement contained in a discussion and analysis 
of financial condition by the management or in 
the results of operations included pursuant to 
the rules and regulations of the [SEC].   
 
Id.  (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1)(A)-(C)). 
 
6 The statute in fact provides a third entrance to the 
safe harbor by immunizing statements that are “immaterial.” 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii).  But, since the regulation 
based on § 10(b) already imposes a materiality requirement, 
17 CFR 240.10b-5, that entrance is not relevant in cases 
claiming a § 10(b) violation.      
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cautionary statements must be substantive and tailored to the 
specific future projections, estimates or opinions in the 
[documents] which the plaintiffs challenge.”  GSC Partners 
CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 243 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, even in 
the absence of such meaningful cautionary language, the 
second entrance to the safe harbor is available to “immunize[] 
from liability any forward looking statement [if] … the 
plaintiff fails to show the statement was made with actual 
knowledge of its falsehood.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 254.  Thus, 
any forward-looking statement is protected if it is either 
accompanied by “substantive and tailored” cautionary 
statements or if the plaintiff fails to show “actual knowledge 
of falsehood.”   
 
B. SCIENTER AND CASE MANAGEMENT    
 
 Before delving into the details of OFI’s allegations, we 
first address OFI’s broader complaint that the District Court 
mismanaged the debate over the motion to dismiss.  OFI 
protests that the District Court erred first by failing to 
consider all of the alleged misrepresentations and then by 
failing to consider holistically the allegations of scienter.  OFI 
attributes both errors, at least in part, to how the Court 
managed the presentation of arguments; in particular, it 
complains of the Court’s order requiring OFI to focus 
argument on only five “artificial[ly] select[ed]” allegations of 
misstatements.  (Opening Br. at 24.)   
 
 OFI’s umbrage is unfounded.  A District Court enjoys 
substantial discretion in managing complex disputes, 
particularly when, as in this case, the claims become 
unwieldy.  See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 
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703 (3d Cir. 1996) (confirming that a court acted within its 
discretion in dismissing an “unnecessarily complicated and 
verbose” complaint for failure to adhere to Rule 8 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  OFI’s Complaint stretches 
to nearly 100 pages and 245 paragraphs, throughout which it 
interweaves allegations about the factual circumstances 
surrounding the merger with citations to the specific 
statements it avers are misrepresentations.  As pled, the 
Complaint presents an extraordinary challenge for application 
of the highly particularized pleading standard demanded by 
the PSLRA.  This is true not only due to the length of the 
Complaint, but also its lack of clarity.  It is difficult to discern 
precisely which statements OFI alleges to be actionable, let 
alone what specific facts are asserted to support each such 
allegation.  The District Court rightly demanded that OFI 
make its contentions more clear, and the efficacy of that 
demand is borne out by OFI’s letter in response to that order, 
which is much more comprehensible than the Complaint.  
(See Letter from Andrew J. Entwistle and James A. Harrod 
dated March 4, 2015, OFI Risk Arbitrages v. Cooper Tire & 
Rubber Co., No. 14-cv-68-RGA (D. Del.), ECF No. 61.)  OFI 
itself acknowledged during the hearing that its arguments 
“need[ed] to be organized in some way.”  (J.A. at 244.)  Now 
that OFI has come to us with the same kind of broad 
averments that drove the District Court to demand specificity, 
we find ourselves more than sympathetic to that Court’s 
position.   
 
 OFI contends that, as a result of the District Court’s 
improperly constraining order,  there were six additional 
“misrepresented and concealed material facts” and omissions 
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that the Court did not consider: 7 1) statements in the Merger 
Agreement regarding internal controls for financial reporting, 
2) the characterization in the 10-Q of the strike as a 
“temporary work stoppage” by a “unionized workforce,” 3) 
statements in the Proxy Statement regarding internal controls 
for financial reporting, 4) misleading statements in the 
September 19, 2013 8-K filing regarding the effect of the 
USW arbitration decision on the merger, 5) an omission in 
that same 8-K of the fact that Apollo “refus[ed] to close the 
Merger absent a price reduction,” and 6) the characterization 
in the September 30, 2013 8-K of the merger as a 
“compelling transaction” that would create a strong global 
company.  (Opening Br. at 29 & n.4.)   
 
 Yet at no point before the District Court did OFI 
protest that these were important issues that required the 
Court’s attention, let alone did OFI point to particularized 
facts to support such an argument.8  Its kitchen-sink pleading 
                                              
7 Though OFI enumerates five such 
misrepresentations, it actually shoehorned a sixth in through a 
footnote.  It took the same approach in its letter to the District 
Court, as noted by the Court during the argument on the 
motion to dismiss.  (See J.A. at 210 (wherein it refers to OFI’s 
disobedience to its order limiting the number of arguments 
they were to highlight, stating, “I see that [OFI] couldn’t, 
actually, follow my instructions, or they could follow my 
instructions, but decided to add in some stuff of their own.”).)  
8 And, in fact, OFI’s briefing before us continues this 
trend.  It neglects to address its allegations regarding “internal 
controls” language in the Proxy Statement, and the three 
complaints related to the 8-K filings receive superficial 
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has been a hindrance at every stage of these proceedings.  
There is some irony, then, to OFI’s criticism of the District 
Court’s effort to bring order to the sweeping denunciations in 
the Complaint.  It was OFI’s job to frame a comprehensive 
set of allegations to support its claims for relief.  When the 
District Court tried to give OFI an assist by ordering greater 
specificity, the latter in fact did a much better job of framing 
the issues.  But here we are now, facing OFI’s objection that 
arguments it did not prioritize when given the chance to do so 
are somehow critical to its case.  The reality is that the 
specific allegations considered by the District Court were not 
selected at random, but were the several chosen by OFI.  
They were its best arguments, and the District Court found 
them all unavailing.  OFI was permitted to bring its most 
compelling arguments to the table, and, when it did, it made 
no meaningful objection to the limitations imposed by the 
District Court.  Under the circumstances, the Court’s 
approach was not problematic.9  
                                                                                                     
treatment at best.  Only the internal control assertions from 
the Merger Agreement and the characterization of the work 
stoppage in the 10-Q are supported by developed arguments.  
That the treatment OFI gave to ostensibly important 
additional issues was so minimal, and was dwarfed by the 
treatment of the issues that were squarely before and 
addressed by the District Court, only reinforces our 
conclusion that OFI’s complaint that the District Court 
ignored important allegations is without merit.      
 
9 We should not be misunderstood on this point.  It is 
certainly possible for a court to go too far in limiting the 
number or character of arguments it will consider, but the 
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 This is true even though OFI contends that the District 
Court erred by failing to follow Tellabs’s instructions “to 
consider the allegations of scienter holistically,” and that the 
Court instead drew “conclusions concerning scienter [that] 
were limited to specific alleged misstatements and isolated 
allegations rather than the fraudulent scheme as a whole.”  
(Opening Br. at 26.)  While we agree that scienter must be 
considered holistically, we are persuaded that the District 
Court did precisely that.10  OFI predicates its claim of error 
on the fact that the Court asked it at oral argument to walk 
through its scienter arguments one at a time and addressed 
them in the same fashion in its opinion.  That the Court was 
thorough in explaining why it found scienter lacking as to 
each asserted misrepresentation does not suggest that it did 
not consider the allegations as a whole.  To the contrary, it 
explicitly cited Tellabs, and its analysis shows that it 
understood the full allegations of the amended Complaint and 
yet found OFI’s scienter argument lacking.  
 
                                                                                                     
District Court did nothing to abuse its broad case 
management discretion in this instance.  
 
10 Our conclusion here is based on a holistic reading of 
the District Court’s opinion.  Because we agree with the 
Court that OFI’s assertions are baseless, its limited 
explication of its scienter analysis suffices.  We do note, 
however, that in closer cases than this one the District Court 
would be well served to grapple with the question of scienter 
with more explicit reference to the broader context.  
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 While it would have been helpful for the District 
Court to explicitly note that it had considered all the 
arguments presented by the Complaint and assessed scienter 
holistically, the Court’s opinion persuades us that it did so.  
We perceive no error in the District Court’s conclusion that 
OFI failed to sufficiently plead scienter or in the Court’s 
management of the arguments leading to that conclusion.   
 
 23 
 
C.  SECTION 10(B)   
 
Section § 10(b) of the ’34 Act prohibits the use of “any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities 
and Exchange] Commission may prescribe … .” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(b).  The SEC has in turn promulgated Rule 10b-5, 
which makes it unlawful for any person to “make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading … in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.” 11 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 
To state a claim for securities fraud under § 10(b), a 
plaintiff must plead: (1) a material misrepresentation in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) 
scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind in the party making the 
representation; (3) reliance by the plaintiff; (4) economic loss; 
and (5) “loss causation, i.e., a causal connection between the 
                                              
11 The Supreme Court has recently spoken about how 
to determine whether a statement was an “untrue statement of 
material fact” and whether it was “misleading,” at least in the 
context of an alleged violation of § 11 of the Securities Act of 
1933.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. 
Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).  The parties 
here mentioned that case only in passing, and Cooper noted 
that our Court has yet to determine whether Omnicare applies 
to § 10(b) claims.  Given that the parties have not 
meaningfully addressed that question and there is no 
necessity to address it, we leave it for another day.  
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material misrepresentation and the loss.” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (internal quotation 
marks and original emphasis omitted). 
 
OFI alleges that various communications by Cooper to 
the public contained material misstatements or omissions in 
violation of § 10(b).  Those communications include the 
Merger Agreement between Cooper and Apollo published on 
June 12, 2013; Cooper’s 10-Q for the second quarter 
published on August 9, 2013; the Proxy Statement for the 
merger published on August 30, 2013; and two 8-K filings 
published on September 19 and 30, 2013.  We address OFI’s 
arguments seriatim. 
 
 i. The June 12, 2013 Merger Agreement 
 
OFI says that the warranties in the Merger Agreement 
contained three material misrepresentations by Cooper – 1) 
that it had “exclusive possession” of the CCT facilities, 2) 
that it had “effective” “internal control over financial 
reporting” by the CCT joint venture, and 3) that it was not 
aware of any “threatened . . . labor strike or lock-out or any 
material dispute, walk-out, work stoppage or slow-down 
involving the Company or any of its Subsidiaries.”  (J.A. at 
66, 102, 162, 164-65.)    
 
We note first that the Merger Agreement also 
expressed two significant caveats.  One was in Section 7.2(a), 
wherein the parties agreed that the “representations and 
warranties … set forth herein shall be true and correct in all 
respects (without giving effect to any materiality or ‘Material 
Adverse Effect’ qualifications contained therein) both when 
made . . . and as of the Closing Date.”  (J.A. at 169.)  Cooper 
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asserts that this provision required that the statements in the 
Agreement be true only on the date it was signed, June 12, 
2013, and the date of closing, a date which never occurred 
due to the merger’s failure.   
 
The second caveat was a lengthy disclaimer that read: 
 
The Merger Agreement contains representations 
and warranties made by the Company and the 
Apollo Parties to, and solely for the benefit of, 
each other. The assertions embodied in the 
representations and warranties contained in the 
Merger Agreement are qualified by information 
in confidential disclosure letters provided by the 
parties to each other in connection with the 
signing of the Merger Agreement. … You 
should not rely on the representations and 
warranties in the Merger Agreement as 
characterizations of the actual state of facts 
about the Company or the Apollo Parties, since 
they were only made as of the date of the 
Merger Agreement and are modified in 
important part by the underlying disclosure 
letters. Moreover, certain representations and 
warranties in the Merger Agreement were used 
for the purpose of allocating risk between the 
Company and the Apollo Parties rather than 
establishing matters as facts. Finally, 
information concerning the subject matter of the 
representations and warranties may have 
changed since the date of the Merger 
Agreement, which subsequent information may 
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or may not be fully reflected in the companies’ 
public disclosures. 
 
(Opening Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, 
Exhibit G at 3, OFI Risk Arbitrages v. Cooper Tire & 
Rubber Co., No. 14-cv-68-RGA (D. Del. Dec. 15, 
2014), ECF No. 54 (emphasis added)).  With these 
caveats in mind, we turn to the three alleged 
misrepresentations.  
 
a. “Exclusive Possession” 
 
The first alleged misrepresentation is the Merger 
Agreement’s statement that Cooper “‘or one of its 
Subsidiaries ha[d] exclusive possession of each Owned Real 
Property and Leased Real Property,’ including the CCT 
facilities.” (J.A. at 102, ¶ 163.) OFI asserts that this statement 
was materially misleading because “Chengshan – and not 
Cooper – effectively controlled CCT’s facilities.”  (Opening 
Br. at 30.)  OFI points principally to three things to support its 
claim of misrepresentation – first, that “at least on[ce] … in 
the past few years … Chengshan denied Cooper management 
access to the [CCT] facility,” 12 (J.A. at 65, ¶ 73); second, that 
                                              
12 OFI contends, at length, that Cooper admitted this to 
be a fact during the Chancery Court litigation.  Cooper 
disagrees.  Whether there was an admission, however, is 
irrelevant.  Even taking the underlying assertion as true and 
admitted, it is insufficiently particular to support OFI’s 
allegation of misrepresentation, as discussed below.  
Consequently, we need not determine if such an admission 
was made.  
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Chengshan and Che had “deep ties and embedded 
relationships with the Chinese government,” (Opening Br. at 
34); and third, that CCT had independent computer systems 
to which Cooper allegedly had limited access (J.A. at 64, 
¶ 72).  OFI claims those allegations were corroborated by 
confidential witnesses13 who said that “Cooper had 
‘apparently very little’ control over CCT,” that “Chengshan 
‘pretty closely controlled CCT,’” and that CCT’s independent 
financial system resulted in Cooper being “closed off” from 
CCT’s financial information.14  (J.A. at 64, ¶¶71-72.)   
 
                                              
13 The Complaint included comments from three 
confidential witnesses, all of whom were said to be former 
Cooper employees, identified by their role and tenure (e.g., 
“Confidential Witness[] 1 [was] the Global Manager of 
Internal Audit … from 2010 through May 2013” (J.A. at 63)).  
The parties vigorously dispute the weight we should accord to 
the statements made by these individuals.  Because our 
standard for evaluating confidential witness statements is well 
defined, see Avaya, 564 F.3d at 263, and because the 
statements in this case, even if fully credited, are either 
irrelevant or insufficiently particularized to support OFI’s 
§ 10(b) claims, we make no comment on this disagreement.    
 
14  OFI also asserts that the fact that CCT locked 
Cooper out of the facility after the Merger Agreement is 
evidence that they never had control of the facility.  Such post 
hoc reasoning is inappropriate when evaluating what Cooper 
knew at the time the merger was announced, and we decline 
OFI’s invitation to engage in it.  
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These alleged facts, taken together and as true, do not 
show that the identified statement was false.  First and 
foremost, we agree with the District Court that the statement 
refers exclusively to the possession of real property.  That 
being the case, we similarly agree that all the factual 
assertions regarding computer systems and ties to the Chinese 
government are not relevant, as they provide no reason to 
conclude that Cooper did not possess the CCT facility.   
 
Thus, the only factual allegations that could suggest 
the identified statement was false are those relating to the 
alleged lock-out of Cooper personnel by CCT at some 
previous date and the testimony of the confidential witnesses 
about the lack of “control” over CCT by Cooper.  Neither of 
those allegations is sufficiently particularized to support the 
conclusion upon which OFI insists – that Cooper “never” had 
exclusive control of the CCT facility.  OFI’s assertion 
regarding the “lock-out,” (Opening Br. at 37), lacks any detail 
as to when the incident occurred, who was kept out, and what 
transpired during the incident and afterward.  It does not 
provide any truly useful information about the status of the 
CCT facility and does not support the assertion that OFI 
would ultimately need to prove – that Cooper lacked 
“exclusive possession” of the CCT facility on June 12, 2013.  
Indeed, the high-specificity pleading standard set out by the 
PSLRA is intended to preclude our giving credence to 
allegations such as these, which fail to “plead the who, what, 
when, where and how” of a supposed misrepresentation.  
Avaya, 564 F.3d at 253.  The confidential witness testimony, 
in addition to suffering from similarly fatal vagueness, is also 
not sufficiently on point.  At best, the confidential witness 
statements demonstrate that Chengshan was the principal 
entity running the CCT joint venture.  Even if true, that 
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conclusion does not mean that Cooper lacked possession of 
the underlying real property on the date in question.  The 
District Court thus rightly concluded that the “exclusive 
possession” statement was not actionable. 
 
b. Internal Controls 
 
OFI next alleges falsity in the Merger Agreement’s 
statement that Cooper “maintains internal control over 
financial reporting [that is] effective in providing reasonable 
assurance regarding … prevention or timely detection of 
unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of the Company’s 
assets that could have a material effect on its financial 
statements.”  (J.A. at 162.)  OFI’s argument is predicated on 
CCT’s financial system having been independent of 
Cooper’s.  That undisputed fact meant that Cooper relied on 
CCT to submit its financial data to Cooper’s headquarters on 
a monthly basis to be incorporated into the company’s 
broader financial reporting systems.  OFI does not, however, 
allege that Cooper had experienced any difficulty with that 
arrangement in the past, let alone anything that would call 
into question its efficacy in detecting fraud that could 
materially affect Cooper’s financial statements.15  Having 
failed to plead any such facts, OFI relies on general assertions 
about the “illusory” nature of Cooper’s “purported control” 
over CCT.  (Opening Br. at 36.)  Such statements lack the 
                                              
15 While CCT did ultimately prevent Cooper from 
gaining access to the financial information, there is no 
evidence that it did so until August 19, 2013.  That event thus 
has no bearing on the truth or falsity of Cooper’s June 13, 
2013 assertions in the Merger Agreement. 
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necessary particularity required by the PSLRA and add no 
weight to OFI’s argument.   
 
c. Threatened Strikes  
 
OFI contends that Cooper’s statement regarding 
threatened or pending labor strikes was a misrepresentation.  
Specifically, it points to the statement in the Merger 
Agreement that there was not “pending or … threatened, nor 
has there been for the past five years, any labor strike or lock-
out or any material dispute, walk-out, work stoppage or slow-
down involving [Cooper] or any of its Subsidiaries.”  (J.A. at 
164.)  That statement was materially misleading, OFI argues, 
with respect to both the workers at CCT and Cooper-
employed members of the USW.     
 
Beginning with the CCT labor disruption, OFI points 
to the allegation that Cooper knew that Chengshan would 
oppose the merger, based on a May 15, 2013 meeting at 
which Cooper and Apollo executives spoke with Che.  
Beyond that, OFI relies on general assertions about Che’s 
alleged power over CCT, the same assertions that underpin its 
“exclusive possession” argument, insisting that we should 
infer knowledge on the part of Cooper that, “once the Merger 
Agreement was announced,” Che’s opposition would lead to 
“a ‘threatened labor strike.’”  (Opening Br. at 37-38.)  We 
decline to connect those dots.  That is the kind of inferential 
leap the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard is meant to 
prevent.  How Che would react was an unknown.  The 
Complaint contains no facts regarding the history of labor 
relations at CCT that show a strike was threatened or that 
Cooper knew a post-announcement strike was likely.  In fact, 
the Complaint indicates that Che might have been supportive, 
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with the allegation that he was willing to go along if 
compensated.  That a strike was later initiated at the CCT 
facility after the agreement was announced is of no moment.   
 
Turning to Cooper’s United States operations, OFI 
also asserts that Cooper “knew [that] the USW would view 
the Merger as a violation of its collective bargaining 
agreement given Cooper’s failure to abide by certain 
successorship clauses in the agreement.”  (Opening Br. at 38.)  
As evidence of this knowledge, OFI points to statements by 
Cooper’s and Apollo’s lawyers before the Court of Chancery 
that they anticipated the USW would take the position that the 
successorship provision applied to the merger and that they 
would need to devise a solution.  OFI also points to testimony 
that the attorneys expected the USW to file grievances on the 
issue and agreed to set up an expedited arbitration procedure 
to ensure that those grievances did not hold up the closing.  
However, OFI acknowledged that all of the actions taken by 
Cooper’s and Apollo’s lawyers were in preparation for the 
possibility that the USW would challenge the merger.  The 
Complaint includes a statement by one of Cooper’s lawyers 
that “Cooper executives believed” that they ought to “‘try to 
convince the Steelworkers that the [successorship] provision 
did not apply’” to the merger.  (J.A. at 67, ¶ 78.)   
 
As the District Court properly recognized, all that OFI 
has pled with particularity is that there was risk of a dispute 
with the USW and that Cooper was aware of and was 
preparing for that risk.  But “[p]reparing for responses to a 
major announcement does not mean that [Cooper] knew 
which responses would occur,” and relying on the fact that 
the USW did ultimately file grievances is “an attempt to 
prove fraud by hindsight,” something our Court has long 
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rejected.  (J.A. at 12 (citing Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. 
Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 158 (3d Cir. 2004)).)  Nothing in 
the pleadings points to knowledge on the part of Cooper that a 
material dispute with the USW was either pending or 
threatened as of June 12, 2013.  The fact that labor action 
followed does not make Cooper’s statement false.  Taken 
together and as true, OFI has failed to plead more than an 
awareness by Cooper that adverse labor action was possible.  
That falls well short of demonstrating with particularity that 
Cooper was aware of a pending or threatened labor action at 
the time the Merger Agreement was announced.  As a result, 
Cooper’s representation about a material labor dispute was 
not materially false.  The District Court properly found OFI’s 
claim in that regard to be wanting.  
 
ii.  The August 9, 2013 10-Q Filing  
 
OFI next turns to the 10-Q statement filed by Cooper 
on August 9 for the fiscal quarter ending June 30, 2013, 
alleging two misrepresentations are in that document: 1) the 
statement that Cooper had maintained sufficient internal 
controls over its financial reporting, and 2) its 
characterization of the strike at CCT, in particular its start 
date, its “temporary” nature, and the motivating force behind 
it.   
 
a. Internal Controls 
    
 OFI targets as misleading the statement in Cooper’s 
10-Q that there were “no other changes in the Company’s 
internal controls over financial reporting during the quarter 
ended June 30, 2013 that have materially affected, or are 
reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company’s internal 
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controls over financial reporting.”  (J.A. at 143.)  The 
argument here mirrors OFI’s argument about Cooper’s 
representations in the Merger Agreement concerning internal 
controls.  (See supra § C.1.b.)  There is, however, the 
additional allegation that CCT effectively shut Cooper out the 
facility before the end of the reporting period on June 30 and 
out of its financial system by early July.  OFI further asserts 
that Cooper failed in its duty to update its 10-Q once it knew 
that there were material changes to its control over financial 
reporting.   
 
 It is worth noting what OFI does not say. At no point 
does it challenge the accuracy or completeness of the 
financial information contained in the 10-Q, nor does it claim 
that the 10-Q omits or misstates any financial information 
relating specifically to CCT and its finances.  The assertion is 
limited to an allegedly false claim of control over financial 
reporting.  But OFI itself asserted that August 19, 2013 was 
the date as of which “Cooper could not collect information in 
its finance and accounting system to provide either internal or 
external financial reporting.”  (J.A. at 71, ¶ 86.)   That this 
allegation in the Complaint appends to that date the 
parenthetical “(but most likely in early July)” is 
inconsequential.  (Id.)  Because these pleadings must be 
particularized under the PSLRA, a bald assertion that the date 
was “most likely” earlier, without more, is insufficient to 
support the allegation that Cooper’s claim that their internal 
controls were operating normally was materially misleading.  
See Avaya, 564 F.3d at 253.  Working from the facts that 
were pled with particularity, Cooper lost its ability to gather 
CCT’s financial information ten days after the filing, and over 
a month after the reporting period closed.  Thus any claim of 
falsity must be based on the same theory propounded with 
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respect to the Merger Agreement – namely that CCT’s 
separate financial system made any alleged control by Cooper 
“illusory.”  As already discussed, that theory is without 
sufficient factual support to be actionable under §10(b).  
 
 Presumably in anticipation of that problem, OFI points 
to the requirements of 17 CFR § 229.308(c) and pivots to an 
assertion that Cooper had a duty to update its 10-Q.  That 
regulation demands that parties “[d]isclose any change in the 
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting,”  17 CFR 
§ 229.308(c), but the requirement to update is tied to the 
evaluations called for by 17 CFR §§ 240.13a-15(d) and 
240.15d-15(d), both of which demand reporting of changes 
that “occurred during … the issuer’s fiscal quarter[].”  
Nothing in the pleading suggests that there was, in fact, a 
change in Cooper’s internal controls during the quarter 
ending June 30, the relevant reporting period for the 10-Q.  
That being the case, there was no requirement to update.16   
                                              
16 Even if Cooper’s statements regarding the internal 
controls proved false, OFI has failed to sufficiently plead 
scienter.  Specifically, the assertion that Cooper, Armes, or 
Hughes, with an “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,” 
Avaya, 564 F.3d at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted), 
withheld information about a loss of internal controls in this 
10-Q is undermined by the fact that they reported having 
suffered exactly that loss only a few weeks later in Cooper’s 
August 30, 2013 Proxy Statement.  It is unclear why Cooper 
would risk litigation at a critical time by materially 
misrepresenting a fact, only to disclose the same fact mere 
weeks later.  The more plausible inference – that Cooper 
simply did not lose control of the financial systems until 
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b. CCT Strike  
 
OFI’s other complaint regarding the 10-Q alleges a 
material misrepresentation in its statement about the strike at 
CCT, specifically Cooper’s failure to identify Chengshan as 
the root cause of the strike and Cooper’s characterization of 
the strike as temporary.17   
 
Beginning with allegations regarding the source of the 
strike, OFI claims that Cooper’s statement that “[t]he 
unionized work force at [CCT] implemented a work 
stoppage,” (J.A. at 146), was misleading because Cooper 
knew that the strike “was orchestrated and implemented by 
Chengshan (not the ‘unionized workforce’),” (Opening Br. at 
40).  In support of that assertion, OFI points to a meeting 
between Cooper executives and Che that took place on 
July 10, 2013.  At that meeting, the objective of which was to 
end the strike, Armes took notes indicating that Che wanted 
to stop the merger and would support the strike.  OFI also 
points to Armes’s testimony wherein he confirmed that 
                                                                                                     
August 19, 2013, when they admit they did – precludes the 
“strong inference” necessary to support OFI’s claim.   
 
17 OFI also says in its brief that the 10-Q includes 
misstatements about the timing of the strike.  OFI did not 
raise that issue in the Complaint, nor did it ever mention the 
issue before the District Court.  Consequently, that argument 
is waived.  See DIRECTV Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It is well established that arguments not 
raised before the District Court are waived on appeal.”). 
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Cooper had been told that “Che was behind all that was going 
on” at CCT.  (A70, ¶ 83.) 
 
In its defense, Cooper asserts that it had no legal 
obligation to speculate about who was behind the strike and 
that any omission on that score did not make its statement 
materially misleading.  There is some force to that response.  
To say that workers implemented a strike does not say who 
planned or motivated it.  But, even taking the statement that 
the “unionized workforce [at CCT] implemented a work 
stoppage” (J.A. at 146) as implying that the strike originated 
with the union and its leadership, not management, it is still 
not actionable because the facts pled do not give rise to a 
“strong inference of scienter” while “tak[ing] into account 
plausible opposing inferences,” Winer Family Trust, 503 F.3d 
at 327 (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323).  The strong 
inference must arise in the context of “all of the facts alleged, 
taken collectively … .” Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323 (emphasis in 
original).  Here, while the Complaint might, with some strain, 
be sufficient to state with particularity that there had been a 
misrepresentation, it still fails to raise a “strong inference” 
that Cooper, Armes, and Hughes were acting with a “mental 
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”  
Avaya, 564 F.3d at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
The identified statement was a single phrase buried 
within a filing that encompassed dozens of pages.  Beyond 
general assertions about the gains to Armes and Hughes if the 
merger successfully closed, OFI did not plead any facts 
demonstrating that the extra information about Che’s support 
for the strike would have materially affected the closing of 
the merger.  That being the case, it is unclear what Cooper, 
Armes, and Hughes stood to gain from this relatively minor 
 37 
 
misrepresentation, if that’s what it was.  Other “plausible 
opposing inferences,” including that the statement was simply 
imprecise or received little attention due to the context in 
which it was made, seem more likely than the inference that 
Cooper, Armes, or Hughes intentionally made this particular 
statement to defraud investors.    
 
OFI’s post hoc scouring of countless pages of 
documents for a stray and inartfully phrased comment that 
can be argued to be technically false seems like just the sort 
of litigation maneuver the PSLRA was meant to eliminate.  
One purpose of the statute is to prevent disappointed investors 
from treating every imprecise statement during a transaction 
as an invitation to file a lawsuit.  Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, 
at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the statute aims to 
“discourage frivolous litigation” and “abusive practices,” 
including “the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of 
securities and others whenever there is a significant change in 
an issuer’s stock price, without regard to any underlying 
culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the 
discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible 
cause of action”). 
 
OFI further alleges, however, that because Cooper 
brought up the topic of the strike, it undertook a duty to 
accurately “convey the impact and nature of the strike and 
shutdown,” which duty it breached by calling the strike a 
“temporary work stoppage.”  (Opening Br. at 40.)  But 
because the description of the strike’s nature is a forward-
looking statement and is surrounded by cautionary language, 
it is protected by the PSLRA safe harbor provision.  Adjacent 
to its acknowledgment of the July 13, 2013 work stoppage, 
Cooper noted that, “[i]f the Company is unable to resolve this 
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labor dispute or if there were to be an additional work 
stoppage or other work disruption, [Cooper’s] business and 
operating results could suffer.” (J.A. at 146.)  Elsewhere in 
the document, where it referred to the strike as “temporary,” 
Cooper also noted that, if there were “[a]n extended work 
stoppage at [CCT, it] could negatively affect the Company’s 
future financial performance.”  (J.A. at 141.)18  The 10-Q’s 
acknowledgement of the business effects of the then-active 
strike, and its reference to the implications of that stoppage 
persisting or later being renewed, provided sufficient notice to 
the reader about the specific risks attached to the forward-
looking statement.  Consequently, we conclude that Cooper’s 
statement classifying the work stoppage as “temporary” falls 
within the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements 
and adds no strength to OFI’s § 10(b) claim.  
 
iii. The August 30, 2013 Proxy Statement 
 
OFI complains next of the Proxy Statement released 
by Cooper on August 30, 2013.  According to OFI, Cooper 
misled investors about the outlook for the merger by 
providing misleading projections, by underplaying the 
severity and effect of the strike at CCT, and by failing to 
                                              
18 Of note, the 10-Q also includes, in various places, 
warnings that it is filled with forward-looking statements, that 
those statements ought not be considered to be assurances, 
and that labor problems could confound any projections.   
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adequately disclose that rival suitor “Party C” was actually 
Chengshan.19   
 
a. Projections  
 
OFI argues that “Cooper’s financial projections 
presented in the Proxy Statement were objectively false 
because they were materially greater than the projections used 
internally and presented to Apollo just weeks earlier.”  
(Opening Br. at 51.)  The Complaint alleges that the forecasts 
provided to Apollo between July 21 and August 9, 2013 
included a substantial drop in projected revenue and operating 
profits relative to the projections shared in the Proxy.20  The 
projections included in the Proxy Statement are in fact more 
favorable than those that Cooper provided to Apollo in late 
July and early August, but that does not make the Proxy 
Statement false.   
 
                                              
19  OFI also makes a general allegation that Cooper 
“falsely and misleadingly assured investors that the Merger 
was on track.”  (Opening Br. at 44.)  However, because it did 
not identify specific affirmative assertions in the Proxy that 
are false, this claim cannot meet the strictures of the PSLRA.  
 
20 The Complaint also references further revised 
projections provided to Apollo in September.  Because those 
projections were not made until after the release of the 
August 30, 2013 Proxy Statement, they shed no light on what 
Cooper knew before that date.  
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The projections attached to the Proxy Statement did 
not stand alone as a statement of affirmative fact.  Indeed, 
their inclusion is accompanied by a lengthy and specific 
disclaimer that states: 
 
[The] financial projections set forth below are 
included in this proxy statement only because 
this information was provided to the Apollo 
Parties … in connection with a potential 
transaction involving Cooper Tire … You 
should not regard the inclusion of these 
projections in this proxy statement as an 
indication that Cooper Tire, the Apollo 
Parties,[or other relevant parties] considered or 
consider the projections to be necessarily 
predictive of actual future events, and you 
should not rely on the projections as such.  
 
 (J.A. at 197-98) (emphasis added).  It also referred to the 
documents as “outdated financial projections” and explicitly 
stated that Cooper “d[id] not intend to update” them.  (J.A. at 
198.) 
 
The projections are plainly not included as statements 
of fact.  Instead, the only relevant statement of fact is that the 
projections were, in fact, the projections that Cooper provided 
to Apollo and the financing bank during the negotiation of the 
deal.  OFI does not allege that Cooper provided Apollo or the 
financing bank with some different set of projections during 
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negotiations.  Consequently, OFI has not pled falsity as it 
relates to the projections.21  
 
b. CCT Strike  
 
Next, OFI contends that Cooper’s claim in the Proxy 
Statement that “[n]either the strike nor the plant slowdown 
are expected to have an effect on the consummation of the 
merger” was a material misrepresentation.  (J.A. at 105-06, ¶¶ 
174-75.)  In support, OFI points to its allegation that the Vice 
Chairman of Apollo sent an email to Armes three days before 
the Proxy Statement went out that referenced the problems 
with accessing CCT financial records and stated that, “[w]ith 
no control over the financial records, there is little chance we 
can get a financing done given the need for your auditors to 
sign off,” adding that “the completion of the [merger] may be 
jeopardized.”  (J.A. at 71-72, ¶ 87.)   The weight of that 
particularized factual allegation is bolstered, says OFI, by the 
allegations that Cooper knew that Che had orchestrated the 
strike and had no intention of relenting until the merger was 
                                              
21   Even if the content of the projections were at issue, 
they would be covered by the PSLRA safe harbor codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1).  The preamble to the projections 
directly identifies them as forward-looking statements and is 
replete with warnings that they had become “outdated,” that 
no party involved considered them to be “predictive of actual 
future events,” and that they constituted “aspirational 
projections based on a consistent growth rate rather than 
likely projections.”  (J.A. 198.)  Such warnings are well 
within the ambit of the safe harbor provision, and the 
projections are therefore immunized from any § 10(b) claim.   
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defeated or he received a payoff.  With Che ensuring that 
Cooper could not access the CCT financial records, and 
Apollo insisting that it needed the financial records to 
complete the merger, there was, according to OFI, no way 
that Cooper could have reasonably believed that the strike 
would not impede the merger closing, making any assertion 
to the contrary a deliberate and material misrepresentation.   
 
This line of reasoning has significantly better traction 
than the rest of OFI’s contentions, but it does not account for 
the PSLRA’s safe harbor.  The statement regarding the effect 
of the strike on the merger includes the word “expected,” a 
term that identifies the statement as forward-looking.  In its 
disclaimer regarding “Forward-Looking Statements,” Cooper 
identified a number of relevant factors that “could cause [its] 
actual results and events to differ materially from those 
expressed or implied by forward-looking statements,” 
including “the impact of labor problems, including 
disruptions at the Company,” and “changes in [Cooper’s] 
relationship with joint-venture partners.” (J.A. at 182.)  While 
those warnings could have been more direct, Cooper included 
considerable detail regarding the CCT strike, and in so doing 
supplied sufficient context to constitute cautionary language 
with respect to its forecast regarding the strike’s outcome.  
Indeed, immediately before the statement about which OFI 
complains, the Proxy explained, in detail, that the strike was 
underway, that CCT’s employees were “demanding 
termination of the merger,” that the strike had started and 
stopped before, and that CCT was then denying Cooper 
access to the facility and withholding financial information.  
(J.A. 201.)  Paired with those significant disclosures, 
Cooper’s warnings cleared the bar for providing the 
“meaningful cautionary statements” required by the PLSRA 
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safe harbor provision.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1).  Any 
investors reading that section of the Proxy Statement were on 
notice of the labor problem and could place in context 
Cooper’s statement of general optimism that the situation 
would be resolved without affecting the merger.   
 
To try to avoid that conclusion, OFI claims that 
Cooper cannot seek the shelter of the safe harbor provision 
because Cooper, Armes, and Hughes could not, given the 
facts on the ground at CCT, have believed that the strike 
would not impede the closing of the merger.  Even if that 
premise were correct,22 OFI misreads the law.  The provisions 
                                              
22 That contention of intentional falsity is suspect, 
given what Cooper, Armes, and Hughes have said about the 
Material Adverse Effect clause of the Merger Agreement.  
They seem to have believed that clause allowed them to push 
the merger forward even in the event of problems at CCT.  
The fact that Cooper sued Apollo in the Court of Chancery in 
an attempt to obtain just such a result confirms that belief, 
and OFI’s Complaint effectively concedes it.  (See J.A. at 60-
61, ¶ 63 (“Cooper negotiated a Material Adverse Effect 
clause in the Merger Agreement that Cooper believed would 
allow it to argue that a negative reaction by Chengshan would 
not constitute an event that would permit Apollo to walk 
away from the deal.”).)  That being the case, it is certainly a 
plausible inference that Cooper did not aim to deceive 
investors through this expressed optimism, but rather that it 
actually believed it could push the merger through even with 
the shutdown.  However, because we need not reach this 
issue, we decline to opine on what Cooper and its officers did 
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of the safe harbor under § 78u-5(c)(1) are disjunctive; they 
immunize any forward-looking statement provided that either 
it is “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements,” id. 
§ 78u-5(c)(1)(A), or “the plaintiff fails to prove the forward-
looking statement … was made with actual knowledge … that 
the statement was false or misleading,” id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B).  
Thus, where a future-looking statement is accompanied by 
sufficient cautions, then “the state of mind of the individual 
making the statement is irrelevant, and the statement is not 
actionable regardless of the plaintiff's showing of scienter.”23  
In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010).  
See also, e.g., Miller v. Champion Enterprises Inc., 346 F.3d 
660, 672 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f the statement qualifies as 
‘forward-looking’ and is accompanied by sufficient 
cautionary language, a defendant’s statement is protected 
regardless of the actual state of mind.”); Edward J. Goodman 
                                                                                                     
or did not believe about the efficacy of the Material Adverse 
Effect clause. 
    
23 This conclusion does not necessarily foreclose the 
possibility that knowing falsity within the cautionary 
language could undermine a claim to protection by the safe 
harbor.  See, e.g., Asher v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 734 
(7th Cir. 2004), as amended (Sept. 3, 2004) (declining to 
dismiss a complaint under the safe harbor provision where the 
defendant “omitted important variables from the cautionary 
language and so made projections more certain than its 
internal estimates at the time warranted”).  Because OFI has 
not challenged the meaningfulness of Cooper’s cautionary 
language on such grounds, however, we need not decide that 
question here, and decline to do so.   
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Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 594 F.3d 783, 795 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n allegation of actual knowledge of 
falsity will not deprive a defendant of protection by the 
statutory safe harbor if his forward-looking statements are 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.”); H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-369, at 44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“The first prong 
of the safe harbor requires courts to examine only the 
cautionary statement accompanying the forward-looking 
statement. Courts should not examine the state of mind of the 
person making the statement.”).   
 
That being the case, whether Cooper, Armes, or 
Hughes believed that statement to be true at the time is 
irrelevant, as long as there was sufficient “meaningful 
cautionary language.”  Since such language was present, 
Cooper’s statements regarding the impact of the strike on the 
merger agreement are protected by the PSLRA safe harbor 
and do not support OFI’s §10(b) claim.  
 
c.  “Party C” Omission  
 
The final issue that OFI raises about the Proxy 
Statement is Cooper’s failure to identify “Party C” as 
Chengshan.  In laying out the timeline of merger negotiations 
between Cooper and Apollo, and between Cooper and a 
number of other parties referred to by pseudonym, the Proxy 
Statement reveals the existence of Party C and its role as a 
potential purchaser.  OFI asserts that, because Cooper told 
shareholders of the existence of Party C, it put that party “in 
play” such that Cooper was then required to disclose that 
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Party C was a consortium led by Chengshan.24  (Opening Br. 
at 45.)  Unfortunately for OFI, and as noted by the District 
Court, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not impose liability for 
“statements that are simply incomplete,” only those that are 
“misleading or untrue.”  Winer Family Tr., 503 F.3d at 330.  
OFI’s Complaint does not identify any affirmative statement 
by Cooper that is rendered untrue or misleading by the 
alleged fact that Chengshan was a participant in Party C.   
 
OFI attempts to rescue its assertion by relying on 
Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp. for the proposition that, once 
a subject is mentioned, the disclosing party is then “bound to 
speak truthfully” on the subject.  964 F.2d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 
1992).   OFI has misconstrued that obligation.  In Shapiro, a 
defendant claimed its financial disclosures were the product 
of management practices that were “‘adequate,’ 
‘conservative,’ ‘cautious,’ and the like,” and we concluded 
                                              
24 It is not obvious that OFI has actually pled with 
particularity that Party C was, in fact, a consortium led by 
Chengshan.  While it refers to that as a fact that was “later 
disclosed,” (J.A. at 79, ¶ 106), the Complaint includes very 
little substance to back its assertion.  It does identify several 
references that suggest that Chengshan had a role as one of 
the rival suitors, but those factual pleadings do not extend to 
the fact that Party C was the anonymous suitor led by 
Chengshan.  The clearest evidence is a financial news post-
mortem of the deal that reported that Chengshan was a part of 
the consortium that acted as a competing bidder and that 
further includes some details about Chengshan’s involvement 
that match the statements about Party C in the proxy, 
including price per share.     
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that, by so describing those practices, “the subject [was] ‘in 
play.’”  Id.  In other words, we held that once a party has 
made a characterization on a subject, it is on notice to speak 
truthfully about the subject of that characterization.  But we 
are not faced with such a circumstance here.  Cooper 
mentioned Party C in the August 30 Proxy Statement only as 
part of a much longer story of how the merger came to be.  
No reference to Party C included any characterizations that 
would trigger a need for additional disclosure.  There thus 
was no misrepresentation by omission regarding Party C, and 
we confirm the conclusions of the District Court to that effect.  
In sum, no assertions in the Proxy Statement were material 
misrepresentations, and therefore nothing in the document 
lends support to OFI’s § 10(b) claim.  
 
iv. The September 8-Ks  
 
Finally, OFI alleges that the 8-Ks released by Cooper 
on the 19th and 30th of September 2013 were misleading 
because they failed to disclose that the USW arbitration 
decision, and Apollo’s reaction to it, had placed the 
consummation of the merger in peril.  In support of that 
allegation, OFI points to the testimony of Cooper’s general 
counsel before the Court of Chancery describing Apollo’s 
reaction to the USW arbitration decision and Apollo’s stated 
concern about the share price for the merger in light of that 
decision and the difficulties at CCT.  OFI also places great 
weight on statements by Armes that, as of late September, he 
had “a lot of reservations about whether [the deal] would 
close or not.”  (J.A. at 82, ¶ 113.)  Although the Complaint 
alleges that Apollo “demanded a downward modification of 
the deal price beginning in September,” (id.), the facts pled 
with specificity tell a more tempered story.  The USW 
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arbitration decision does appear to have had some influence 
on Apollo’s evaluation of the deal, but it is far from clear that 
it immediately precipitated a substantial change in position.25  
From the Complaint, it is apparent that, while Apollo 
expressed its displeasure with the agreed-upon price as of a 
meeting on September 17, it only “demanded a price 
reduction” over the phone on September 25.  (J.A. at 83, 
¶ 114.)  The first formal request for a price reduction did not 
occur until September 28, when two emails from Apollo’s 
counsel to Cooper’s counsel requested a price reduction of 
$2.50 per share and asserted that the reduction was 
“necessary to see the Merger through.”  (J.A. at 83, ¶ 114).   
 
Turning first to the 8-K dated September 19, 2013, the 
Complaint fails to plead with particularity that Apollo had 
requested a price reduction, let alone suggested that the 
merger’s closing would be contingent on such a reduction, 
prior to the issuance of that 8-K.   That being the case, OFI 
has not pled what it claims to be a material omission.  What’s 
more, even if such a request had been made, none of the 
statements made by Cooper in that document would have 
been rendered false or misleading by the omission of that 
development.  OFI also complains that Cooper did not 
                                              
25  The Complaint quotes an Apollo representative as 
saying that, in addition to other concerns, “now we have this 
arbitration decision and the Steelworkers to deal with,” but 
also includes the statement by that same representative that if 
they could “fit [the arbitration decision costs] in the financing 
great, but if not, they have to come out of somewhere, and 
that somewhere was Cooper shareholders … .”  (J.A. at 82, 
¶ 113.)   
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describe the merger as “imperiled” or in danger in its 
communication.  (Opening Br. at 52.)  But Cooper was under 
no obligation to use any adjective, let alone a pejorative one, 
to describe the state of the deal.  See In Re Donald J. Trump 
Casino Sec. Litig. – Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 375 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“We do not mean to suggest that § 10(b) or Rule 10b-
5 requires insiders to characterize ... transactions with 
pejorative nouns or adjectives.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Consequently, OFI’s allegations as to the 
September 19 8-K have no merit.  
 
Turning to the September 30 8-K, OFI complains, 
albeit obliquely, that Cooper’s omission of the fact that 
Apollo had demanded a price cut amounted to a material 
misrepresentation.  That argument fails on two fronts.  First, 
the omission of that fact did not make any affirmative 
statement misleading.  Again, an omission, standing alone, 
does not create a cause of action under § 10(b).  See Winer 
Family Tr., 503 F.3d at 330 (explaining that, while “[l]iability 
may exist under [§10(b)] for misleading or untrue statements, 
[it does] not for statements that are simply incomplete”); cf. 
Information to be Included in the Report for Form 8-K (SEC 
Form 873), Section 1.02, at 5, https://www.sec.gov/about/ 
forms/form8-k.pdf (“No disclosure is required … during 
negotiations or discussions regarding termination of a 
material definitive agreement unless and until the agreement 
has been terminated.”).   
 
Second, even if Cooper’s failure to disclose the price 
reduction demand constituted a material misrepresentation, 
OFI has failed to establish a plausible inference of scienter.  
Cooper argues persuasively that it did not need to disclose the 
demanded price reduction because it believed Apollo had no 
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contractual right to demand such a reduction.  That calls into 
question whether OFI’s few relevant factual allegations could 
give rise to a “strong inference” that Cooper knew the 
omission of Apollo’s request constituted a misrepresentation, 
Avaya, 564 F.3d at 267-68, especially when taken together 
with the fact that the Court of Chancery confirmed Cooper’s 
belief on that score (J.A. at 304 (noting that “Apollo lacked 
the contractual right to demand renegotiation of the merger 
agreement based on the necessity to renegotiate USW 
contracts”)).  Cooper’s choice not to disclose a request by 
Apollo that it was not entitled to make thus does not 
constitute an actionable material misrepresentation.    
 
In sum, we find nothing of merit in OFI’s allegations 
regarding either of the 8-Ks filed by Cooper in September 
2013.  
 
 C.   SECTIONS 14(A) AND 20(A) CLAIMS 
 
 OFI advances two final claims of substantive error, 
arguing that the District Court improperly dismissed its 
claims under Section 14(a)26 and Section 20(a)27 of the ’34 
Act.  OFI’s § 14(a) claim is predicated on a finding of a 
                                              
26 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) and creating a cause 
of action for material misrepresentations made in a Proxy 
Statement. 
 
27 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) and establishing 
derivative liability for supervisors of those committing an 
independent violation of federal securities laws, in this case 
the alleged § 10(b) violations discussed supra. 
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material misrepresentation in the Proxy Statement and its 
§ 20(a) claim is similarly predicated on a finding that a 
federal securities law was violated.  Having concluded that 
the Proxy Statement contained no misrepresentation and that 
no laws were broken, we likewise conclude that there was no 
error in the District Court’s dismissal of those claims.   
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
